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ABSTRACT
South Africa’s township revolts have generated much excellent research on the central role
played by rebellious, urban youth. This article explores a parallel set of intergenerational
conflicts that opened up in the marginal rural districts of the Natal Midlands, which were
exacerbated by apartheid’s Forced Removals of labour tenants from commercial farming
districts to crowded “Native Reserves” in the 1970s.  At this time of deepening poverty,
elders worried about the rising incidence of juvenile petty crime, particularly amongst the
teenagers who increasingly took itinerant, seasonal labour on the commercial farms. Some of
these young migrants, unable to find steady factory work at a time of mounting
unemployment, also played a leading role in the illicit, sometimes criminal networks of South
Africa’s growing popular economy. Finally, I show how some of these youths were
mobilised by Inkatha during the war against the African National Congress in Johannesburg –
often to the revulsion of older men who abhorred their socially harmful, thuggish violence,
which spiralled uncontrollably along migrant routes. Thus the political violence was often
known as the udlame: a brutal savagery that destroys households, communities and society.
INTRODUCTION
This paper explores the significance of the generational tensions that opened up in rural,
migrant sending districts of South Africa from the 1970s onwards. “Rebellious youth” – an
important aspect of African history, given that its societies have been structured by
conflicts/relationships between generations (Abbink & van Kessel 2005, Lindsay & Miescher
2003, Waller 2006) – have already been thoroughly studied by historians of South Africa’s
cities. The historical importance of the township youth revolts and, more broadly, the
country’s brutal history of industrialisation and high rates of urban crime have given urgency
to such research questions (Glaser 2008, Kynoch 2008). Typically, burgeoning cities are seen
as a solvent to patriarchal control, creating new categories of youth groups, often described
by worried elders as “delinquents”.1 Yet for all this valuable research focused on the urban
arena, South African crime statistics suggest that extremely high murder rates have long been
found in many chieftaincy areas2 – indicating that similar questions about South Africa’s
rural youth deserve equal analytical attention to their better known township counterparts.
This paper has three connected ambitions. One is to provide an account of the
widening generational tensions in the poor, peripheral districts of the rural Natal Midlands in
the 1970s and 1980s at a time of economic crisis when patriarchal households came under
pressure.3 Rural youth associations, intergenerational conflicts and migrant gangs during the
early 20th C (e.g. Beinart 1991; Kynoch 2005) and the apartheid period (e.g. Delius 1994;
McAllister & Deliwe 1994; Mchunu 2007; Niehaus 2000) have been surveyed in some depth.
Here I explore how the deep history of youth gangs and “juvenile delinquency” in the Natal
Midlands, which was linked to a protracted process of rural dispossession (Bradford 1987),
were exacerbated by apartheid’s forced removals of labour tenants from commercial farming
districts in the 1970s.  I pay particular attention to the patterns of youthful migration/mobility
that lay beyond the control of household heads. At this time of deepening poverty, elders
worried about the rising incidence of juvenile petty crime, particularly amongst the bands of
boys who increasingly took casual, itinerant, seasonal labour on the commercial farms. Some
of the older teenagers and young men, unable to find steady factory work at a time of
mounting migrant unemployment, also played a leading role in the illicit, sometimes criminal
networks of South Africa’s burgeoning popular economy. This was epitomised by the growth
of the violently competitive, minibus-taxi industry, whose networks, centred on the cities of
Durban and Johannesburg, were dominated by Zulu-speaking migrants. The rank-and-file of
the minibus-taxi industry and its related, illicit trades, such as cattle rustling and car-jacking,
were often young, marginal, migrant men.4 (Similar spatial patterns have been noted
elsewhere on the continent – cf. Anderson 2002; Nolte 2004.) Consequently, the violence that
gripped the peripheral districts of the Natal Midlands in the 1980s was popularly described as
a crisis caused by the thuggish actions of delinquent youth.5
As much as patriarchal controls eroded while violence along migrant routes spiralled
outwards in the 1980s, it is also important to note attempts that were made to rebuild social
relationships. A second, interrelated theme considered in this article thus concerns the efforts
made within the rural district of Msinga to mediate the complex conflicts – known as
“faction-fighting” - of the 1980s: fights that were often linked to the criminal activities of
small gangs of young men.6 For as much as institutions of chieftaincy came under pressure –
to the extent that men avoided nomination for office because of the dangers it brought – the
ethical ideals of eldership were paradoxically even more valued during a time of discord.
Nonetheless, the 1980s was not a promising time for peace-building, given the
mounting conflicts between the African National Congress (ANC) and Inkatha, the latter
which particularly mobilised amongst Zulu-speaking migrants in Johannesburg. A third aim,
therefore, is to broach broader questions concerning the political violence that accompanied
South Africa’s democratic transition. There is a rich literature that considers the generational
fault lines that structured much of this violence. One strand of this research particularly
emphasises the central role played by “township youth” and “schooled youth” as “vanguards
and vandals” (e.g. Marks 2001, Seekings 1993). Another strand concerns the older generation
of migrant labourers who often rallied to the chieftaincy against the ANC’s Comrades
(Bonner & Ndima 1999; Bonner & Nieftagodien 2001, 2008; Segal 1992). Hickel (2015) and
Waetjen (2006) provide convincing accounts of why many of these older men joined the
Inkatha Freedom Party, which promised to protect patriarchal privilege that was threatened
by young ANC comrades. At the same time, we run the risk of oversimplifying the patterns
of the political violence if we simply argue that IFP elders were ranged against ANC-
supporting youth. Indeed, a number of contemporaneous accounts noted the important role
played by young militants within Inkatha’s ranks – often to the revulsion of older migrants
who abhorred their thuggish violence (Ndlovu 1994; Xeketwane 1991, 1993).7 Thus a focus
on young delinquents helps us understand how the confused,  uncontrolled patterns of
political violence, which spread so rapidly along migrant routes across the region, was so
often known as the udlame – a brutal savagery that  destroys social relationships.
POVERTY, PILFERING AND THE PLANTATIONS
Across Africa ‘youth may have begun earlier and lasted longer’ as a consequence of the
disruptions of colonialism (Waller 2006: 81). Certainly, this was the case in the settler
farming districts of the Natal Midlands of South Africa, where a long history of youth gangs
and intergenerational tensions is linked to a protracted history of rural dispossession.
Bradford (1987) and McClendon’s (2002) work reveals how the expansion of commercial
agricultural production in the Natal Midlands during the 1920s and 1930s placed immense
strain on African labour tenant households, with women, children and, most notably, youths
forced to provide more labour to the settler farmers. Bands of youths became a potent force in
the Midlands, particularly in the district of Weenen, which had particularly high numbers of
labour tenants. During the interwar years, young iigosa in Weenen district were transformed
‘from leaders of dance associations to “generals”’ elected by their peers. On the weekends
rival igosa would ‘lead their armed detachments to weddings and beer drinks where “faction-
fights” often erupted’ (Bradford 1987: 46). Their activities sometimes caused great disquiet
amongst the chiefs who nominally held authority over the tenants living the white farms.8
In this section I explore how these long-standing intergenerational tensions in the
Natal Midlands were exacerbated by apartheid’s forced removals – a process that would see
1.1 million labour tenants across South Africa evicted from the farms. According to a
contemporary account:
In September 1969, police helicopters flew over [Weenen district] …picking up any
men who could be found at home, on footpaths, or ducking under bushes to hide.
Their arrest and subsequent trial at a special court at Weenen marked the beginning of
Forced Removals in a district which has a notorious place in Natal’s agricultural
history.9
Thus came ‘the mixed up period’ when, over the course of a few years, perhaps 20,000
African labour tenants were forced off the commercial farms of Weenen into the
neighbouring district of Msinga, which fell under the KwaZulu Homeland Authorities. This
was a time when once moderately prosperous labour tenants – migrants who had kept cattle
and ploughed their own land on the Weenen farms, whilst working in South Africa’s cities –
lost the cattle that made them men; when their livestock ‘went to the speculators at
knockdown prices’. The Removals also led to social dislocation and conflict: ‘a time of great
thieving’, as ‘poverty and the rising cost of food forced many people who cannot get jobs to
find that stock-theft and dagga [cannabis] growing are a secure way of making a living’.10
The Alcock family, the founders of the Church Agricultural Project, as had come to
Msinga in 1973 hoping to support smallholder-farming. Their newsletters provide a finely
wrought account of the divide between an older generation of labour tenants who had
ploughed Weenen’s land and a younger generation who would have a very different
relationship to the land and rural livelihoods in Msinga. Older men and women were well
versed in natural lore; they could name dozens of grasses – ‘intunga, mlalatensha,
uqambalala, ubabe, ingongoni, imbuthane, isinandi, imbanjane, umsingizane’ – each with
different characteristics and uses.11 But most young boys had little detailed knowledge of and
interest in these matters, given that they had little hope of putting a plough to the ground. The
Alcocks worked closely with some of these older men, such as Seliswe Dladla, a migrant
worker who laboured on Johannesburg’s construction sites for R50 a month, yet had been a
man of substance, with fifty cattle, one hundred goats, two wives, when he lived as a labour
tenant on Weenen’s farms. The forced removals had been disastrous, his cattle and iron
plough bought at a discount by speculators.12 Surveys conducted by the Surplus People
Project at Sahlumbe, a settlement at the entrance of the Mashunka valley of Msinga,
confirmed such accounts. Of the households surveyed, 93% had grown crops when they lived
on the “white farms” at Weenen; now not one had a field. Moreover, Msinga was a thornveld
district lying in a rain shadow. The 1955 Tomlinson Commission estimated that here a black
smallholder farmer required 83 hectares and sixteen cattle to make a living. Following the
relocations, average land-holdings in the district were 1.6 hectares per person – ‘much of this
stony hillside’.13 Nonetheless, many from the older generation remained keen to make some
sort of a livelihood from the land, and participated in the initiatives of the Church
Agricultural Project. ‘We are men again! At last our hands can feel the hair of living cattle!’ –
they jubilated as they drew an ox-plough across the Church Agricultural Project’s farm.
‘How funny we are making a noise about what was once an ordinary thing.’14
The dissolution of the patriarchal homestead and authority during the apartheid era is
also strongly evoked by a trade union researcher, Paul Stewart, who visited rural homesteader
M.X. recently retrenched from a factory, in the neighbouring district of Nqutu. The other
crisis falling on migrant households across South Africa at this time was the decline of
unskilled, blue collar work as, from the mid-1970s onwards, ‘the economy simply grew too
slowly to keep up with growth in the labour force’ (Planning Commission 2011). M.X. was
among the 100,000 unskilled workers laid off from the metal industry in the early 1980s. Paul
journeyed to Nqutu to find himself pitched into the middle of a family crisis. M.X.’s second
wife had recently absconded along with eight young children. ‘Quiet – don’t let the secret
out,’ an older sibling gestured to another child who was talking to the researchers (Stewart
1981: 15, 17). Other family members, too, were evading M.X.’s patriarchal authority. Some
openly complained that M.X. was too poor to provide Christmas presents. And whilst his first
wife deferentially knelt whenever she addressed him, she would not reveal the whereabouts
of another daughter who had also fled the family home. M.X. was eager to show off his oxen
plough to his guests; yet he struggled to yoke these scrawny beasts that clearly had not been
used as draught animals for some time.
What were the consequences of such scenarios of homestead dissolution for youth
socialisation? Outwardly, childhood continued as before. Primary schooling arrived late in
the poorest and most peripheral rural districts of South Africa – surveys suggested that well
into the 1980s only 30% of children in Msinga district attended school.15 Consequently bands
of pre-pubescent boys spent much of their childhood outdoors, herding cattle.  (Indeed, the
district continued to hold relatively high numbers of goats and cattle.)16 Stick fighting
remained the predominant sport: a means of testing oneself against friends and rivals, and a
preparation for manhood. Gangs of boys – perhaps led by a champion stick-fighter (ingqwele)
– enjoyed hunting mice and rabbits, which were barbequed and eaten in the veldt.  Petty theft
of small livestock such as chickens (considered women’s possessions) was normally
considered a boyish prank worthy of a thrashing rather than a crime.17 In this sense, the forms
and expressions of male socialisation that were seen in the 1970s resembled the patterns that
had been seen a generation earlier.
At the same time, the poverty and “confusions” that had followed the forced removals
gave these boyish escapades a sharpening edge. Studies across the Natal Midlands and nearby
districts noted how the decline of smallholder production and the increasing circulation of
purchased goods ‘necessitated the reorganisation of household activities around a wide
variety of income generating activities’ (Mpanza & Nattrass 1987: 23). Women knitted,
sewed and sold their handcrafts. Msinga was very poor, even by rural South African
standards, and at Mashunka young girls turned household chores into petty trades, for
instance carrying loads of heavy loads of pilfered firewood into town for richer households.
(They were paid with cabbage leaves.)18 These were the economic pressures that lay behind
young boys’ hunting, poaching, pilfering and scavenging.
In some households such boyish misadventures shaded into patterns of delinquent
behaviour that lay beyond the control of the community. A medical mission in the
neighbouring Nqutu district noted that every rural community had a handful of children who
‘scrounged for food… and occasionally raided homes’.19 Take the Siwela brothers, aged
eleven and twelve, who were running wild. ‘Time and again they have been caught and
returned to their grandfather who just cannot cope. They have been beaten for their
misdemeanors… Their mother is in Durban and comes home only at Christmas; their father is
unknown’ (Clarke & Ngobese 1975: 37). Likewise, legal sanction (such as it existed, for the
few policemen allocated to Msinga district were busy running their own criminal rackets)
held few fears for young children living hardscrabble lives. S.D. was ‘the scrawny gang
leader of all the naughty kids at Mashunka’. He had the rust coloured hair of kwashiorkor and
had been the main breadwinner of his family since the age of seven, when his parents were
killed in a stock-theft feud. ‘He laid ambushes, fought, poached, trespassed and stole’ and
boasted ‘about his latest escapades to make quite sure that everyone will know’. 20 At one
stage he briefly worked as a weekend errand boy at a trading store in the nearby town of
Weenen, until he demanded his wages early and, when refused, stole a nearby bicycle in a
moment of pique. He was locked up in the police station in Tugela Ferry town for a few days,
until he was brought to court and punished with five lashes of the cane. ‘How was it?’ his
gang asked when he returned. ‘Kumnandi [sweet]… They bring you a cup of water and a
slice of bread and you sit all day watching the policeman go past.’21
More worrying for parents and elders were the vast numbers of boys and girls who
absconded to do casual, togt labour on “the plantations” (i.e. the white farms). The household
surveys undertaken by the Surplus People Project suggest that day and seasonal work on
commercial farms became an increasingly important source of livelihoods in the Natal
Midlands.22 Whilst Africans had worked on commercial farms since the early decades of the
20th century, it is likely that flows of itinerant labour increased after the forced removals
eradicated many African tenants from commercial farming districts. (One old man
remembered: ‘I never had to work on the plantations [i.e. white farms]… like all our children
do today.’)23 Increasingly, Weenen’s white farmers sent lorries into Msinga in search of
casual labour on a 100km round journey each day. Others were hired for longer periods,
particularly during the harvest months that required a glut of labour. They journeyed the
length and breadth of Natal on the back of farmers’ lorries.24 The numbers of youths taking
seasonal work is difficult to obtain, for the apartheid government did not keep decent
statistics on the subject. But campaigners’ investigations suggested this practice was
widespread across Natal, the Free State and Transvaal. 25
Intriguingly, the children often went off to work on the commercial farms in small
groups and gangs. Creina Alcock described S.D.’s band leaving in high spirits: it was a
youthful rite of passage, one in which there was ‘a bit of an adventure and a wage’.26 Another
observer, a black clergyman, suggested that child labourers and their parents sometimes
believed that ‘the difficult life provided by farm work is maturing’ (A.S.S. 1983: 18). We see
this sense of joint purpose and pride in the remarkable group photo portraits of teenage farm
workers held by the Killie Campbell Library in Durban: they proudly show off their best
clothes, which they have presumably bought with wages earned from farm work. Indeed,
roving photographers toured the commercial farming districts of the Natal Midlands, for
teenage farm workers would pay for Polaroid portraits that they could send on to friends and
lovers.27
At the same time teachers, parents and elders feared that the deepening incidence of
itinerant, togt labour meant youths were escaping adult control. ‘Sex is free and all social
conventions are broken... Vast numbers of children learned dagga smoking.’28 Some farms
were notorious for abuse. One young woman successfully sued for child maintenance after
she was raped. Others were beaten: ‘It’s easier to sjambok a girl lying on a table than to whip
them on the ground,’ boasted another white farmer.29 It was also hungry work: ‘the food was
good – porridge, cabbage beans and some meat – but there was very little of it’, remembered
M.D. He worked on the farms aged ten, but fled after a year (Bond 1979: 19). The squalid
living conditions endured by child labourers on South Africa’s commercial farms are
captured in the social realism of documentary photographers, whose gritty black-and-white
portraits were exhibited by the London-based Anti-Slavery Society in the 1980s. Another
elder explained: ‘any child who had grown up in ‘The Wilderness’ [a common term used to
describe the commercial farms] will be a trouble to society’.30
IZINKABI – OXEN
‘I was asked what I want to be when I am big,’ explained an Msinga youth when he was
around fourteen years old (Bond 1979: 46). ‘It is difficult to talk about the future. All I can
say is that I want to be a MAN.’ In their late teens young men (inisizwa) from Msinga
travelled to South Africa’s cities in search of a living, now that they were too old for seasonal
farm labour, considered work for women and children. However, the paths that their fathers
had taken towards manhood – steady “blue-collar” employment in the cities, which would
allow them to marry and build their own homesteads on Weenen’s farmlands – was blocked
for this younger generation of migrants. This was the context in which some youths
discovered that violent crime could provide a shortcut to a manhood and respect of sorts.
Heuristically, one might speak of three overlapping forms of illicit and often violently
criminal activities that were linked to the transformation of patterns of migration/mobility.
For one, a handful of transient young men organised themselves into impromptu gangs that
engaged in crime sprees that brought them quick returns. The newsletters and reports of the
Church Agricultural Project provide a vivid description of how the return of half-a-dozen
young thugs from the migrant hostels of Johannesburg to Msinga sparked off an epidemic of
cattle rustling and armed robberies.31 After each robbery the young men toured the
neighbouring districts and rural townships, hurriedly selling off their booty, the only evidence
that would convict them. They feasted on their stolen goods with girlfriends, “wives” and
followers. After one robbery a witness saw S.X. driving down the valley, jubilantly stopping
to tell everyone ‘there was lots of money... and he would be buying meat and liquor to
celebrate’.32 The brazenness with which such gangs operated shows how violent crime might
reward young men with a brutal prestige of sorts. This was a fleeting fame, however – they
would soon fleeing vigilante groups and police pursuers into the “tent towns” in neighbouring
districts and the run-down migrant hostels and burgeoning squatter camps found in the big
cities.
One reason why these young drifters operated with such impunity was because they
hid in the cracks of the collapsing system of labour migrancy. From the mid-1980s onwards,
as apartheid controls crumbled, new shack settlements emerged on the fringes of cities and
small rural towns. Migration was no longer an oscillation between city and countryside;
instead it became a tangled network of multidirectional movements (Potts 2010; Todes 2001).
The decline of factory work also transformed the migrant hostels into slums. Radical
researchers provided compelling contemporaneous accounts of the illicit and illegal activities
that found haven in dilapidated hostel complexes, as they filled up with unemployed young
men. ‘Crews disguised as repair men… looted dormitory rooms’; disputes escalated into
confrontations and stabbings (Sitas 1983: 266).33 Men pissed in bottles at night, for visiting a
toilet was too dangerous. ‘So much fighting, so much blood over nothing,’ lamented one
man. ‘The Lord turned his gaze away in shame from the hostel, I am sure. There, the Devil
has become king, and every man was becoming a tsotsi’ (Sitas 1983: 267).
*
Young men were also at the forefront of the rise in faction-fighting that gripped many
districts of the Natal Midlands in the 1980s. Msinga was infamous for these conflicts – the
district ‘surges and eddies with restlessness’, noted an early newsletter of the Church
Agricultural Project. ‘When we arrived here in 1975 there was tension because Mvelase
youths were helping themselves to Mtshali cattle and goats. Like all the jobless at Msinga,
they had nothing to do all day, so rustling neighbours’ stock was a game with a meal at the
end of it.’34 Elders put their fears starkly: ‘Our sons do not want to work. They have learnt
that pay is low, conditions are bad... They have found that theft brings better returns. Jail is
not feared… These young men steal guns and bullets, which makes them lords at home.’35
From the viewpoint of Msinga’s elders, there were perhaps three reasons why young
migrant men had become ‘lords at home’. One was the close linkages between young men’s
pursuits, such as poaching and cattle rustling, and the burgeoning minibus-taxi industry
whose owners raised capital by engaging in stock-theft and other criminal pursuits. South
Africa’s violently competitive, minibus-taxi industry has been well-documented. It became
the main mode of transportation in the mid-1980s, as new webs of commuting and migration
proliferated at a time apartheid patterns of spatial segregation collapsed (Gibbs 2014: 431-4).
Its networks that centred on the cities of Durban and Johannesburg were often dominated by
migrants from the Natal Midlands.36 As well as carrying passengers, minibus drivers
trafficked other illicit goods.37 The multi-billion rand dagga growing trade was especially
prevalent in the poor, peripheral districts of the Natal Midlands.38 The remote valleys were
also centres of a roaring trade in stolen livestock. Stock-thieves were often car-jackers too,
and Msinga’s valleys were littered with the carcasses of vehicles that had been stolen in
South Africa’s cities.39 These multi-centred networks were suffused with the idioms of
migrancy. Stolen vehicles were “skinned” in hidden valleys like stolen, slaughtered cattle.
Men said they were piercing their ears (for the older generation of migrants had worn
earplugs) when they bought a new minibus.40
A second (and related) element was that young men were at the forefront of a new,
more brutal and criminalised form of faction-fighting that gripped Msinga in the 1980s: ‘it is
not the impi who are fighting... it’s the izibengu – criminals, gangsters’.41 Clegg (1981)
writes that, in the middle decades of the 20th century, faction-fighting echoed contained
rituals of stick-fighting: rival impi would publically assemble on a hill and ritually call each
other out in ‘a spectacle of violent confrontation’. Yet with the intensification of rural
conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s faction-fighting was increasingly undertaken by well-armed
war-parties that carried out assassination-type killings. Clegg describes these war-parties as
amashinga (stick-fighters), a term that alludes to longer established patterns of youth
socialisation and conflict.42 These fighters also acted as hired hit-men – colloquially known
as izinkabi (oxen) in Johannesburg and KwaZulu/Natal – not least in the internecine feuds of
the taxi industry.43 (A peace agreement signed in 2000 and posted of the office of the Weenen
Taxi Association is telling: ‘We will not attack and kill each other; we will not steal from
each other; we will not kill each other’s livestock; we will not damage each other’s property;
we will not intimidate, threaten or insult each other.’) Thus there were close linkages between
rural faction-fighting, illicit trades and criminal violence that spread along migrant routes
from Msinga into the cities.
A third point is that the violence of young fighters was particularly disquieting
because they broke established codes and conventions of warfare and flaunted gerontocratic
controls. Elders complained that they were no longer respected; the conflicts were not the
ritually contained, faction-fights of their youth. Although fights still started in long-
recognisable ways – a stick-fight between rival dance teams; a dispute over land; stock-theft
directed at a neighbouring clan – the violence of the war-parties then spiralled beyond
control.44 Codes of war were ignored: ‘People are killed even when they are hiding. You
can’t kill a man who is hiding from the fight.’45 Geriatrics fled into the hills. Sometimes they
hid with their drinking companions.  At other times they were herded into crèches, guarded
by younger fighters from their own clans from those of rivals. Extortion was also an integral
part of faction-fighting, for provisioning a war party with guns and bullets and hiring
transport (typically a minibus) was a costly business. Men who wanted no part in the fighting
paid a fee and then disappeared into the shack settlements of South Africa’s cities until the
fighting was over. To pay the levies demanded by the gunmen, women for their part sold off
their goats and took extra togt labour on the white farms. (‘They [the gunmen] are wasting
our bullets’ Msinga women complained, when they heard fighters on the hillside loosing
rounds into the night sky.) 46 War also spilled from the hillsides into homesteads as fighters
foraged for supplies, raided homes and held up vehicles, much like common criminals. And
the fighters sometimes raped women – a violation of beliefs which held that for the safe-
guarding medicines to work the fighters must be purified by chastity.47
‘Although the unrest in Msinga is conventionally blamed on disputes resulting from
overpopulation and shortage of land, it has become increasingly clear to us that the root of
most wars lay in the criminal activities of small gangs of young men,’ concluded the Church
Agricultural Project in the mid-1980s, during a spate of faction-fights.48 Their activities
meant that ‘entire communities of hundreds of people are eventually embroiled in the trouble
– drawn in unwillingly out of fear.’ Another participant at a peace meeting stated the problem
succinctly: ‘it is the young men who are quarrelling. Only the young men can settle this.’49
*
Msinga’s elders worried that youths had become ‘lords at home’; but the young men who fell
into crime related to the burgeoning minibus-taxi industry take on a more forlorn appearance
in Johannesburg’s court records. Given that this industry was the main form of capital
accumulation for black South Africans in the 1980s, a minority of prosperous vehicle owners
became ‘exemplars of patriarchal authority in South Africa’s post-industrial, highly unequal
society’ (Gibbs 2014: 433). Successful taxi owners from the Natal Midlands bought township
houses, practised polygyny, acquired pedigree hunting dogs, and kept large cattle herds. But
they were in the minority: the industry, which often employed marginal, migrant youths, was
also infamous for its fragmented, precarious working conditions.
Perhaps the image of an ox (inkabi) best encapsulates the struggles faced by young
migrants working in this setting, and more generally trying to survive in the city. Many
migrants used the epithet ‘an ox perseveres’ to describe the forbearance that was required to
endure exhausting, casual labour and make a life in the squalid migrant hostels and shack
settlements (Ndima 1997).50 Indeed, it is important to emphasise that many young men
working in the taxi industry did not whole-heartedly embrace criminality, but rather found
themselves drawn into the activities of violently competitive owners and rival associations.
Working fourteen hours a day, for instance, taxi-rank marshals wielded whips as they herded
commuters away from rival vehicles into their masters’ minibuses (Barrett 2003; Bonner &
Nieftagodien 2008: 382). Similarly, minibus drivers, who were hired-and-fired on the spot,
were beholden to bosses who sometimes used their young men as “foot soldiers” in the
violent competition for new routes (Nkosi-Thomas & Randera 2000).
At the same time, oxen are not simply draught animals eternally harnessed to a
plough; many are admired and much loved for their proud, stubborn characters.51 Similarly,
the young taxi drivers from the Natal Midlands working in Johannesburg took pride in their
toughness and resilience. They muscled their way into township taverns, naming their tables
naming their tables after the districts of the Midlands: ‘Mahlabatini, Msinga [and] Nqutu’.52
They drank bottled beer; wore All Star trainers; permed their hair straight; and proposed love
to sophisticated, perfumed, township women (for firewood-gathering rural women carry the
smoky musk of open fires). They boasted and declaimed their exploits in Johannesburg, ‘the
city of the rambling mountains [the mine dumps], where women beat their husbands’
(Xeketwane 1993: 154). And their hard-boiled commentary was the talk of the townships, for
instance the bumper sticker that declared: ‘Built From Genuine Stolen Parts’ (Jijana 2013:
23). The tough-talking quips aimed at aloof township women who rode their vehicles was
notorious too. Township youths explained why they dared not challenge the taxi drivers who
insulted their girlfriends: ‘even if you defeated him in a fair fight he would call his folks and
you would have to flee.’53
Moreover, a few oxen are champion fighters whose victories against rival bulls at the
cattle dipping tanks are celebrated in the praise songs of herd boys (Mathaba 2000).
Likewise, the izinkabi hired guns of the taxi industry ‘elicited a certain wary reverence, not
just from their peers living in the migrant hostels, but from the township as a whole’.54
Indeed, in one trial the defendants explained why they had specifically sought out an inkabi
from the migrant hostels: ‘it was felt that Zulus were best suited for such violent action’
(Daily Dispatch 26 August 1987). This was an ambivalent symbol of masculinity.
THE RETICENCE OF ELDERSHIP
As much as violence along the migrant routes spiralled outwards in the 1980s, we should also
note attempts within rural districts to bring these conflicts under control. Given that violence
was often experienced as a generational crisis, it is not surprising that much effort focused on
disciplining young delinquents and reincorporating dissonant parts back into the whole.
Hence kin-based ideals of social cohesion were deeply treasured at a time of great social
stress that undermined the authority of elders and chiefs.
One place to start is to note how elders, with limited success, sought to discipline
individual “delinquents”. As discussed above, the waning of established patterns of migrant
labour and the chaotic living conditions inside migrant hostels allowed individual, transient
thugs to avoid sanction. Nevertheless, elders made sporadic attempts to impose their
authority. One Zulu man explained to researchers visiting a migrant hostel in Soweto how his
nephew was stabbed to death by a homeboy in a dispute over a girlfriend. The fighting youths
had been brought before elders, admonished and separated; but an unwitting Pedi neighbour
later opened a door to the attacker, who struck with a knife. The killer ‘is still around the
hostel,’ explained the uncle. ‘We are not going to have him arrested; we will settle this thing
in December [at a chief’s court] at home’ (Peskin & Spiegel 1976: 28). Occasionally senior
men living in the hostels took more direct action. In 1983 M.D. was ‘chased out by the other
hostel dwellers in an action so unprecedented that it was the talk of Mashunka valley’.55
By contrast, the documents of the Church Agricultural Project provide a detailed
account of how a spate of robberies committed by a small band of young men across Msinga
district in the mid-1980s was quashed by the resolute action of senior men.56 They formed
hunting parties and went in search of the stolen goods and the thieves. They pointed guns at
the outlaws and their associates and dragged them before chief’s courts.  Relatives suspected
of harbouring the young men were threatened with banishment. Most importantly, police
from Pietermaritzburg swept the district for guns – the first serious crackdown in years.
Eventually, most of the youngsters were jailed for whatever offences could be pinned on
them. Even those that escaped conviction were severely chastened, having been badly beaten
during police interrogations.
More structured, well provisioned, vigilante groups also formed in response to the
activities of organised gangs committing stock-theft and armed robbery in rural South Africa.
In each of these instances, powerful senior men were at the heart of the response to criminal
activities. Senior men living in the migrant hostels of Johannesburg’s East Rand townships,
for instance, told researchers how they had formed vigilante groups back in their Nqutu home
district in response to the rising levels of stock-theft committed by taxi owners. Here it seems
that key leaders were senior factory workers who were also involved in local Inkatha
structures.57 At Mashunka Mountain, by contrast, vigilante bands were organised within local
communities by isigodi and izinduna.58 One man was trekking home to Limehill with cattle
bought at an auction in Msinga when he was accosted in a quiet gorge by a well provisioned
band of men, ‘all with guns and bullets’, who demanded proof of ownership. The man hunted
for the receipt in his pockets, ‘speaking very meekly, as you do, when addressing a man with
a gun’. The cattle had been legitimately bought, so the vigilantes ‘took us home, gave us beer,
and we slept there that night, as is the custom with travellers’.59
*
The larger faction-fights and local wars were even more fractious. Households and
communities splintered as men scattered, hiding from the violence in the hills or the shack
settlements of the cities. One murder could set off cycles of kin-based, vengeance killings
(see Clegg 1981). The worst of the fighting choked the rural valleys. Rival factions set up
roadblocks and ambushes that throttled the district’s main arteries; they shot up the taxis
belonging to their rivals and dragged men off buses, executing them alongside on the road.
‘Now the roads are blocked the district has to cope with an unsettling mix of gossip and
rumour, and snatches of news that can only add to the tension,’ wrote the Church Agricultural
Project during one Mashunka war.60
At the same time, we should also note the attempts to restore social communication
and relationships. Whilst faction-fights became synonymous with sexual violence, they also
gave prominence to senior women.  Sometimes women provided a protective shield and safe
passage for non-combatant men stranded in non-mans-land. They also used their moral
authority to browbeat chiefs and izinduna into organising peace meetings.61 During one
particular conflict the women from opposing sides even attended each other’s funerals. This
was a sensitive process, given the internecine divisions caused by violence. Distraught
mourners sometimes refused reconciliation: ‘Your husbands killed my father... And your sons
also! Go! I don’t want you!’ Thus the groups of women from either side of the fighting
warily kept apart, during the burial and the cleansing ceremonies, washing at separate pools
in the mountain streams, waiting until young girls from the bereaved family brought over
trays of tea and bread as a gesture of appeasement. 62
Because the Church Agricultural Project had the only phone in the valley, their house
was another important centre of correspondence and diplomacy. During one particularly
vicious war, the phone would start ringing from 5am as migrant men illicitly called in from
factory phones to check on their families. A cook at the huge Baragwanath Hospital in
Soweto, who emerged as the ‘diplomatic agent amongst those who had not run home,’ called
each day for a bulletin.63 Similarly, local magistrates might broadcast the news of a
particularly important peace meeting through Radio Zulu – a radio station particularly
popular amongst migrants because its programmes read out messages sent between families
and friends.
A handful of senior izinduna, who commanded respect through force of personality,
were perhaps the most important mediators.64 They bravely summoned groups of young
fighters to their courts. Their gatherings were recognised as safe spaces for negotiations
between rival factions. At the same time as war parties hunted their rivals across South
Africa, these elders conducted shuttle diplomacy by taxi and bus, meeting fighters on a
mountain top or a city hostel. Inevitably, after months of torturous dialogue, ‘the guns sputter
out’. Rituals of forgiveness and reconciliation, intended to bind the fighting men back into the
wider body politic, would symbolise the peace accord.65 ‘Then taxis are summoned to carry
the breadwinners back to eGoli (the Reef/Johannesburg)’. Thus whilst faction-fighting
increased in frequency and intensity in the 1980s, older ideals of eldership remained.
*
At the same time, we must note how kin-based violence corroded social authority. Eight
izinduna were murdered on Mashunka Mountain in four years.66 ‘It’s no longer an honour in
these parts to be selected an induna’, noted Creina Alcock in another newsletter written in
1980.67 Three years later, Neil Alcock and four fellow members of a peace delegation would
be ambushed and killed in the Church Agricultural Project’s minibus when driving home
from a courthouse mediation meeting, whilst trying to settle a conflict that had already
claimed dozens of lives. Later, the hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
the Natal Midlands uncovered more instances in which peace monitors – men of authority,
such as chiefs and clergymen – walked into murderous ambushes as they tried to mediate
conflicts between rival clans and taxi associations. 68
One reason that chiefly office brought such danger and exposure, which made
mediation so difficult, was that social relationships were fragile and fluid. A transient son
who had stolen and sold on building materials belonging to his uncle, for instance, might hold
a family feast from the proceeds of another robbery six months later.69 Most significantly, as
much as men of violence took lives and broke apart families, it was illicit, sometimes outright
criminal activities that brought money into the poorest rural districts of the Natal Midlands.
From an early age children in Mashunka were taught to ‘be careful what they say’ – not in the
romanticised manner of Rudyard Kipling’s Smuggler’s Song, but because loose talk would
bring killings into their homes.70 For in the mid-1980s, many of the men of substance and
authority in Mashunka valley were making their money in South Africa’s notoriously
fractious, minibus-taxi industry, and its associated trades such as stock-theft. This foggy,
‘grey area between licit and illicit enterprises, the paternal benevolence of the successful taxi
owner who provides for neighbours and the kin based violence that permeates the industry’
was remarkably difficult to navigate (Gibbs 2014: 446). Such fine grained moral sensibilities
posed particular difficulties for izinduna who were expected to mediate disputes and judge
cases brought before them. Moreover, most chiefs and headmen did not enjoy much in the
way of government resources and support – the chief induna of the Mthembu clan, for
instance, held his court cases in a rusting bus, the courthouse having been destroyed in a
storm. Their authority was their word and little else.71
Consequently, some men refused nomination to traditional leadership.72 Another
cautious induna in Msinga, for instance, cannily adjudicated tricky stock-theft cases by
levying court fees on the plaintiff that were equal to the fines he demanded from the guilty
parties, gaining a reputation for equivocation that kept danger from his door.73 The few
izinduna on Mashunka Mountain who sought to uphold the authority of their office trod a
lonely path. Sometimes they slept at home, when everyone else had fled into the hills,
dangerously preserving their dignity and impartiality. These were ‘reticent men, listeners,
wary,’ who chose their words carefully. 74
UDLAME – POLITICAL VIOLENCE, SOCIAL CHAOS
As much as elders sought to mediate Msinga’s conflicts, the final decade of apartheid was not
a propitious moment for peacemaking. In July 1990 Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the Chief
Minister of the KwaZulu Bantustan, launched the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) at a rally in
the P.W.V – the city-region that sprawled across Pretoria Witwatersrand and Vereeniging –
provoking a spasm of violence across the city. In most of the 220 migrant hostels spread
across the city IFP supporters seized control. These hostels became ‘fortresses of fear’: both
sanctuaries for Zulu-speaking refugees fleeing their burnt-out, township homes, and also
rallying points from which IFP  militants mounted attacks on neighbouring townships (Segal
1992). 14,000 lives were consumed in the next four years – most in the P.W.V. region –
during a time of political violence that was commonly known as the udlame. This powerful
word conveys social chaos: a violence that ‘initiates a spiral of revenge attacks’; ‘that opens
the door to the violent resolution of many other [community and family] disputes… which
might otherwise have ended peacefully (Peires 2000: 99; also Kelly 2015). The udlame had
different sources and took various forms as it spread across South Africa. Here, I explore how
the political violence that spiralled out of the migrant hostels of Johannesburg was entwined
with and exacerbated by patterns of conflict associated with the criminality of uncontrollable
young migrants.
Violence was concentrated in and around the migrant hostels, where older patterns of
eldership had been unravelling for some time as industrial decline transformed them from
factory dormitories into hubs of the taxi-industry and its related illicit trades. In 1990 there
was a decisive rupture now a new wave of young migrants flooded into the dilapidated
dormitories. One NGO was undertaking an upgrading project at Vosloorus Hostel when its
residents, older men who had lived inside the hostel for decades, fled the violence. V.L., for
instance, had been conscripted into an impi and forced to join the first clashes. A fortnight
later he escaped for Orange Farm informal settlement, which was teeming with similar
refugees.75 Such accounts are congruent with the research bravely conducted by Babylon
Xeketwane (1993: 41, 43) in the migrant hostels of Soweto at the height of the violence. His
snapshot surveys suggested that the majority of hostel residents were less than 30 years old;
most had come to Johannesburg in 1990/91. There were even a few reports in the press
(never proven) claiming that the IFP leadership was bussing in young men from rural districts
notorious for faction-fighting.76
Ndlovu and Xeketwane’s remarkable accounts emphasise the despair of the older
generation at the criminality that the young migrants brought into the hostel. First, it seems
that the age-set youth leaders, so important in the faction-fighting of the Natal Midlands,
were often at the heart of the political mobilisation of the early 1990s. At Meadowlands
hostel ‘the inisizwa told us not to waste time but to arm ourselves. We took up arms and have
not laid them down’ (Xeketwane 1991: 28). At George Goch hostel the young leader (igosa)
of the best dance troop in Bergville, a district that is almost as well known for its stock-theft
and dagga smuggling as Msinga, played a central role in the fighting (Ndlovu 1994: 21). A
second indicator of the transformation of the hostels was the influx of women – mainly
refugees fleeing violence – into what had once been a male-only domain. In turn, hostels
became notorious for the sexual violence: ‘some [township women] come voluntarily
whereas others are dragged against their will because they think they are smart. They think
we are worth nothing because we are township rejects; that is why we drag them in kicking
and screaming (Xeketwane 1993: 114).77 Third, township thugs fleeing vigilante justice often
sought refuge in the hostels, falling in and making joint enterprise with the migrant stock-
thieves and carjackers. ‘Cars are hijacked... girls are jack-rolled [raped at gunpoint]…
attempts to seek peace were overridden… the younger generation had become
uncontrollable’ (Xeketwane 1993: 128).
At the same time we might note that many young migrants – the ‘oxen’ struggling to
endure the city – also saw their fragile livelihoods and social networks shattered by the
political violence. Two images of devastation recurred in a series of interviews concerning
memories of this period that I conducted in 2011. One was the destruction of ethnically-
cosmopolitan relationships. A man from Nqutu, for instance, explained how, having been
conscripted into an impi, he fled his rented backyard shack for refuge in the migrant hostels,
having first put his girlfriend and their child on a bus back to her mother in the northern
Transvaal. He never saw her again.78 The second concerned the feuding within the minibus-
bus taxi industry, which not only destroyed lives and livelihoods but also brutally split the
townships into rival routes and zones, further isolating those living in the hostels.79 Indeed,
many migrant taxi drivers fled the hostels for the shack settlements of the city (Xeketwane
1993: 117): ‘Life was unbearable for me… ... I was always scared that one day they [the
passengers] would find out I was one of them [the hostel dwellers]. Besides, how do you kill
your own customers?’ Much as Msinga’s war parties had dragged whole communities into
faction-fights, many young men now found themselves sucked into the udlame.
Udlame savagery was not restricted to the hostels and townships. It also spread along
migrant routes, devouring lives. Indeed, it was as hired muscle beholden to more senior
political leaders and criminal bosses that some young migrants were inserted as hired guns
into the spiralling political conflicts. Most infamous was the Nqutu Massacre of 1993 in
which the kraal of an ANC-aligned traditional leader, Chief Joseph Molefe, was attacked by a
gang of sixty masked men. Allegedly the gunmen were organised by Albert Mlaba, a
township taxi owner and dealer of stolen cars, who had become close to the IFP leadership in
the East Rand of the P.W.V. city-region after he supplied them with transport to attend
political rallies.80 Violence also crossed political boundaries.  Take the example of another
feud transported along the transport corridors of KwaZulu Natal from city taxi ranks to the
rural Bergville district.81 What made it so vicious was that rival taxi operators hailed from
rival clans who were aligned to opposing political parties. The local induna and vicar who
attempted to broker a peace deal at a series of public gatherings were themselves murdered
by a young hit-man from the migrant hostels. The gunman claimed he was linked to an ANC-
aligned Self Defence Unit, and the killing was a political act; the judge ruled it was a criminal
conspiracy. ‘He [Rev. Izak Shandu] was a man who worked for peace,’ noted the judge by
way of brief tribute to one of the murdered peace monitors.82
The udlame likewise fed violence within Msinga in the early 1990s. ‘Some of the
change came from the accumulation of violence outside the valley. Some of the change came
from the accumulation of war [and conflict] here at home,’ explained Creina Alcock. ‘Among
the many deaths that have touched [the] Church Agricultural Project…’ a white farmer from
Dundee, murdered by three young carjackers; ‘the fiancé of a member of staff... killed after
he agreed to help an old man safeguard his pension from his son’; a teenage migrant
necklaced [i.e. burned to death] by township Comrades; an adolescent and his parents whose
homestead was attacked by stock-thieves.83
It was also during the udlame that S.D. (‘the scrawny gang leader of all the naughty
kids at Mashunka’, mentioned in Section One) was shot dead. Now a young man, he may
well have been embroiled in the political violence, for he had certainly been mixed up in
criminal activities. A few years previously he had been ‘hired to shoot a man, but didn’t quite
manage.’ The Church Agricultural Project wrote him a short obituary:
An early death [was] not unexpected for a boy who had lived dangerously even when
he was small... He may be remembered as the boy with kwashiorkor... [who] stole
milk to feed his orphan brothers – a family of small criminals who managed to rear
themselves after their parents were killed in bed for involving themselves in stock-
theft.
CONCLUSION
South Africa’s political violence and persistently high rates of violent crime have focused
researchers’ attention on the cleavages within society, not least generational conflicts
between elders and young men. Much of the writing has focused on the ANC-supporting,
township youths and Comrades who fought against Zulu-speaking migrant elders who
supported Inkatha (Bonner & Nieftagoiden 2001; Hickel 2015; Waetjen 2006). There have
also been excellent studies of divides within rural districts that sometimes led to youth revolts
against the chieftaincy (Delius 1996, Niehaus 2000). This article, focused on the districts of
the Natal Midlands, has particularly emphasised how established forms of patriarchal
authority were disrupted by changing forms of mobility. Historically, the Natal Midlands was
well known for its youth gangs and faction-fighting; processes related to intergenerational
conflicts that have followed rural dispossession. During the apartheid era there was an
intensification and metamorphosis of these conflicts. Forced removals broke up the homes of
labour tenant families; mounting industrial unemployment particularly affected unskilled
migrant labourers. Thus migrant elders, whose authority had rested on building large
homesteads, rich in cattle, wives and dependents, found themselves emasculated by these
wrenching shifts in South Africa’s political economy. At this ‘time of confusion’ and
increasing poverty, youthful patterns of migration/mobility increasingly lay beyond the
control of elders. Bands of boys fled family homes to take itinerant work on commercial
farms. Small gangs of young men were also involved in the intensifying patterns of stock-
theft and faction-fighting that accompanied the rise of the minibus-taxi industry. Indeed, the
violently competitive minibus-taxi industry epitomised the burgeoning networks of the
popular/informal economy.
Some young migrants played also a leading role in the udlame – the political
conflicts, criminal violence and social chaos of the 1980s and 1990s – that uncontrollably
spread along migrant routes. The political violence took various patterns in different regions.
Here I have focused on the young men in the migrant hostels of the P.W.V. city-region who
were conscripted into the ranks of Inkatha. Elsewhere, particularly in the areas around
Richmond and Umbumbulu, gangs of young men fought for both the ANC and Inkatha. What
was common to many of these conflicts was that patterns of political violence were often
associated with the juvenile criminality of migrant gangs. It was these shape-shifting forms of
violence – for instance the involvement of Albert Mlaba’s city-based, car theft gang in a
massacre that targeted supporters of an ANC-aligned chief – that made the udlame so brutal.
In this instance, like many others, minibus-taxis carrying a well armed war-party transported
violence along migrant routes.
Yet if much of this article gazes uncomfortably at the spectacle of youth violence, I
also note attempts that were made to heal the body politic: the efforts of elders to stop
Msinga’s faction-fighting and the peace monitors who mediated South Africa’s political
violence. 84 Likewise, if (a minority of) young men were the primary perpetrators of violence,
young men tended to be its main victims too – and throughout the article I have drawn
attention to the youths who found themselves sucked into the faction-fighting and political
violence of the era. This article ends with the brutality and social chaos of the udlame; but we
might also look beyond, at how patterns of post-apartheid peace-building have sought to
resolve these conflicts, not least addressing the violence associated with young men.85
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Bibliography
Abbink, J. and I. van Kessel eds. (2005) Vanguards of Vandals: youth politics and conflict in
Africa. Leiden: Brill.
Alcock C., (1988) ‘Impi’, Leadership South Africa 7 (1): 36-41.
Alcock R., (2014) ‘The Curious Case of the Unknown Farmers’: seminar presentation:
Institute for Poverty Land and Agrarian Studies.
Anderson, D. (2002) ‘Vigilantes, violence and the politics of public order in Kenya’, African
Affairs 101 (405): 531-55.
[A.S.S.] Anti Slavery Society (1983) Child Labour in South Africa: a general overview. Anti
Slavery Society: London.
Bank, L. (1990) ‘The making of the Qwa Qwa “mafia”? Patronage and protection in the
migrant taxi business’, African Studies 49 (1): 71-93.
Bank L., 2011: Home Spaces, Street Styles: contesting power and identity in a South African
city. London: Pluto Press.
Beinart, W. (1990) ‘Migrant workers and child labour in the Natal Sugar Estates, 1913-48’.
Institute of Commonwealth Studies seminar paper.
Beinart, W. (1991) ‘The origins of the indlavini: male associations and migrant labour in the
Transkei, African Studies, 50 (1 & 2): 103-128.
Bernhardt, Dunstan and Associates (1992) ‘The Story of a Hostel Project: A special report on
Nguni Hostel at Vosloorus’. Johannesburg: Planact.
Bond, K. (1979) The Story of Mboma. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
Bonner, P. (1987) ‘The Russians on the Reef, 1947-57: urbanisation, gang warfare and ethnic
mobilisation’ in P. Bonner, P. Delius and D. Posel (eds.), Apartheid’s Genesis, 1935-62.
Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
Bonner, P. and V. Ndima (1999) ‘The Roots of Violence on the East Rand, 1980-1990’
Seminar Paper, Institute for Advanced Social Research: University of Witwatersrand.
Bonner, P. & N. Nieftagodien (2001) Kathorus: a history. Johannesburg: Longman.
Bonner, P. & N. Nieftagodien (2008) Alexandra: a history. Johannesburg: Wits University
Press.
Bosch, D., D. Budlender and S. Tshabalala (2002)  ‘Toward a National child labour action
programme for South Africa Discussion document: South African Department of Labour.
Bradford, H. (1987) A Taste of Freedom: The ICU in rural South Africa, 1924-30. (London:
Yale University Press.
Campbell, C. (1992) ‘Learning to Kill? Masculinity, the Family and Violence in Natal’,
Journal of Southern African Studies 18 (3): 614-628.
Carton B. (2000) Blood from your Children: the colonial origins of generational conflict in
South Africa. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
Clarke L. and J Ngobese (1975) Women without Men: a study of 150 families in the Nqutu
District of KwaZulu. Durban: Institute for Black Research.
Clegg, J. (1981) ‘Ukubuyisa Isidumbu – “bringing back the body”: an examination of
vengeance in the Msinga and Mpofana rural locations, 1882-1944’ in P. Bonner (ed.),
Working Papers in Southern African Studies, Vol 2. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
Debates of the Transkei Legislative Assembly (Umtata, 1964-76)
Debates of the National Assembly, Republic of Transkei (Umtata, 1977-87)
Delius, P. (1996) A Lion amongst the Cattle: reconstruction and resistance in the Northern
Transvaal. Oxford: Currey.
Denis P., R. Ntsimane and T. Cannell (2010), Indians versus Russians: an oral history of the
political violence in Nxamalala, 1987-93. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications.
Elder, G. (1995) ‘Apartheid, Geography and Gender: transforming South Africa’s migrant
worker hostels’. PhD thesis, Clark University.
Gibbs, T. (2014) ‘Becoming a “Big Man” in Neo-Liberal South Africa: masculinities in the
minibus-taxi industry’ African Affairs, 113: 431-48.
Glaser, C. (2000) Bo-Tsotsi: the youth gangs of Soweto, 1935-1976. Oxford: Currey.
Glaser, C. (2008) ‘Violent crime in South Africa: historical perspectives’, South African
Historical Journal, 60 (3): 334-52.
Gore, C. & D. Pratten (2003) ‘The politics of plunder: the rhetoric of order and disorder in
Southern Nigeria’ African Affairs 102 (407): 211-240.
Hartshorne K., (1992) Crisis and Challenge: Black Education, 1910 – 1990. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Hickel, J. (2015) Democracy as Death: The Moral Order of Anti-Liberal Politics in South
Africa. London: University of California Press.
Institute for Security Studies, ‘Crime Hub’
<https://www.issafrica.org/crimehub/map/>, accessed 1 June 2015
James, D. (1983) The Road from Doornkop: a case study of removals and resistance.
Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations.
Jijana, T. (2013) Nobody’s Business: a search for answers after a taxi murder (Mampoer Shorts:
Johannesburg.
Kelly J., (2015) ‘“Women were not supposed to Fight”: the gendered uses of martial and
moral Zuluness during uDlame, 1990-4’, in J.B. Shetler (ed.), Gendering Ethnicty in African
Women’s Lives. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Kynoch, G. ‘Urban Violence Colonial Africa: A Case for South African Exceptionalism’,
Journal of South African Studies, 34, 3 (2008), pp.629-45.
Kynoch G., (2005) We are Fighting the World: a history of the Marashea gangs in South
Africa, 1947-1999. Athens NH, Ohio University Press.
Kynoch, G. (2013) ‘Reassessing transition violence: voices from South Africa’s township
wars, 1990–4’ African Affairs 112 (447): 283–303
la Hausse, P. (1990) ‘“The cows of Nongoloza”: youth, crime and amalaita gangs in Durban,
1900-36’, Journal of Southern African Studies 16 (1):.79-111.
Lindsay L. and S. Miescher (eds) (2003) Men and Masculinities in Modern Africa.
Heinemann: Portsmouth NH.
Malan, R. (1990) My Traitor’s Heart. London: Bodley Head.
Marks, M. (2001) Young Warriors: youth politics, identity and violence in South Africa.
Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press.
Mathaba, J. (2000) ‘Cattle Praises of the kwaMthethwa area of Empangeni, KwaZulu Natal,
as a reflection of some socio-cultural norms and values of the area’. MA thesis, Uuniversity
of KwaZulu Natal.
Mathis, S. (2013), ‘From warlords to freedom fighters: political violence and state formation
in Umbumbulu, South Africa’ African Affairs 112 (448): 421-39.
McAllister, P. and D. Deliwe 1994. ‘Youth in the Transkei: the demise of traditional youth
associations and the developments of new forms of association and activity: 1975-1993’.
Grahamstown: Institute for Social and Economic Research Working Paper No 64.
McClendon, T. (2002) Genders and generations apart: labour tenants and customary law in
segregation-era South Africa, 1920s to 1940s. London: Heinneman.
Mchunu M., ‘Cultural Change, Zulu Masculinity and Intergenerational Conflict in the context
of Civil War in Pietermartizburg, 1987-1991’, in T Shefer, K Ratele, A Strebel, N Shabalala
and R Buikema (eds.), From Boys to Men: Constructions of masculinity on contemporary
society (UCT Press, 2007), pp.225-41.
Mchunu, M. (2013) ‘A History of Political Violence in KwaShange, Vulindlela district and
its effects on the Memories of Survivors’. PhD thesis, University of KwaZulu Natal.
Meintjes, L. (2004) ‘Shoot the sergeant, shatter the mountain: the production of masculinity
in Zulu ngoma song and dance in post-apartheid South Africa’, Ethnomusicology Forum, 13,
(2): 173-201.
Morrell, R.  (2001) ‘The times of change: men and masculinity in southern Africa’ in R.
Morell (ed.) Changing Men in Southern Africa. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press.
Mpanza, Z. and J. Nattrass (1987) ‘Poverty, Migration and Unemployment in Dumisa: a rural
area of KwaZulu’ Centre for Applied Social Sciences Working paper 10, University of Natal.
Murray C. (1980) ‘Migrant labour and changing family structure in the rural periphery of
South Africa’ Journal of South African Studies, 6 (2): 139-56
Murray C. (1981) Families Divided: The impact of migrant labour in Lesotho. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Ndima, G. (1997) ‘“Ayizond’ Inkabi” (An Ox Perseveres): the changing lives of migrants
from the Nqutu district of KwaZulu Natal to Germiston, 1950-1980s’. PhD thesis, University
of Witwatersrand.
Ndlovu, D. (1994) ‘Trust in God and Weapons’ South African Quarterly 1 (1): 1-24.
Niehaus, I., (2000) ‘Towards a Dubious Liberation: masculinity, sexuality and power in
South African lowveld schools, 1953-1999’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 26 (3):
387-407
Nolte, I. (2004) ‘Identity and violence: the politics of youth in Ijebu-Remo, Nigeria’, Journal
of Modern African Studies 42 (1): 61-89.
Ntsebza, D. (August 2005) ‘Committee of Inquiry into the Underlying Causes of the
Instability and Conflict in the Minibus Taxi Industry in the Cape Town Metropolitan Area:
report to the premier’. Cape Town: Government Printer.
Nkosi-Thomas, L.G. & M. Randera (2000) ‘Final Report: commission of enquiry into the
causes of taxi violence and related unresolved deaths in Gauteng Province’. Johannesburg:
Government Printer.
Peires, J. (1994) ‘Unsocial Bandits: The stock thieves of Qumbu and their enemies’. History
Workshop, University of Witwatersrand.
Peires J., (2000) ‘Traditional Leaders in Purgatory: local government in Tsholo, Qumbu and
Port St Johns, 1990-2000 African Studies 59 (1): 97-114
Peskin M. & A. Spiegel (1976) ‘Migrant Labour Project: urban hostels in the Johannesburg
area, a preliminary study’. Institute for Social and Economic Research, Grahamstown.
Platzky L. & C. Walker (1985) The Surplus People: forced removals in South Africa.
Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
Potts, D. (2010) Circular Migration in Zimbabwe and Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa.
Oxford: Currey.
Preston-Whyte E. & S. Nene (1991) ‘Black women and the rural informal sector’ in E.
Preston-Whyte and C. Rogerson (eds.) South Africa’s Informal Economy. Cape Town:
Oxford University Press.
Richards, P. (1998) Fighting for the Rainforest:  war youth and resources in Sierra Leone.
Oxford: Currey.
Seekings, J. (1993) Heroes or Villains. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
Seekings, J. (2006) ‘Beyond heroes and villains: the rediscovery of the ordinary in the study
of childhood and adolescence in South Africa’, Social Dynamics 32 (1): 1-20.
Segal, L. (1992) ‘The human face of violence: hostel dwellers speak’, Journal of Southern
African Studies, 18 (1): 190-231.
Sitas, A. (1983) ‘African Worker Responses on the East Rand to changes in the Metal
Industry, 1960-1980’. PhD Thesis, University of Witwatersrand.
Sithole J., (1998) ‘Land, Officials, Chiefs and Commoners in the Izimpi Zemibango in
the Umlazi Location of the Pinetown District in the Context of Natal’s Changing Political
Economy, 1920-1936’. M.A. thesis, University of Natal.
Spiegel, A. (1987) ‘Dispersing dependants: a response to the exigencies of labour migration
in rural Transkei’ in J. Eades (ed.) Migrants, Workers and the Social Order. London:
Tavistock.
Smith, N. (2015) ‘Historical Romanticism: hoe intimacy drove popular justice in South
Africa’s history’. Politics and Protest Workshop paper, City University New York.
Stewart, P. (1981) ‘A Worker has a Human Face: Mahlabatini, Vosloorus Hostel and an East
Rand foundry: The experiences of a migrant worker’. BA Honours thesis, University of
Witwatersrand.
Streek B. and Wicksteed R. (1981) Render unto Kaiser: a Transkei dossier. Johannesburg:
Ravan Press.
Todes, A. (2001) ‘South African Urbanisation dynamics and the normalisation thesis’ Urban
Forum 12 (1): 1-26.
van der Waal, C. S. (1996) ‘Rural children and residential instability in the northern province
of South Africa’ Social Dynamics 22 (1): 31-54.
van Onselen, C. (1982) Studies in the Economic History of the Witwatersrand, vols 1 & 2.
Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
Waetjen, T. (2006) Workers and Warriors:  masculinity and the struggle for the nation in
South Africa. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
Waller, R. (2006) ‘Rebellious Youth in Colonial Africa’, Journal of African History, 47 (1):
277-92.
Xeketwane, B.M. (1991) ‘The War on the Reef: The Political Violence on the reef’s Black
Townships since July 1990’. BA Honours thesis, University of Witwatersrand.
Xeketwane, B.M. (1993) ‘The relation between hostels and the political violence on the reef
from July 1990 to December 1993: A case study of Merafe and Meadowslands hostels in
Soweto’. MA thesis, University of Witwatersrand.
Xulu, N. (2012) ‘Changing Migrant Spaces and Livelihoods: Hostels as community
residential units, KwaMashu, KwaZulu Natal’. PhD thesis, University of Cape Town.
